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OF RULES AND REPRESENTATION (AND 
DYSFUNCTION) IN THE UNITED STATES SENATE 
Daniel Wirls* 
WENDY J. SCHILLER & CHARLES STEWART III, ELECTING THE SENATE: 
INDIRECT DEMOCRACY BEFORE THE SEVENTEENTH AMENDMENT 
(PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS 2015). PP. 236. PAPERBACK $ 29.95. 
 
STEVEN S. SMITH, THE SENATE SYNDROME: THE EVOLUTION OF 
PROCEDURAL WARFARE IN THE MODERN U.S. SENATE (UNIVERSITY 
OF OKLAHOMA PRESS 2014). PP. 410. HARDCOVER $ 34.95. 
Whether largely a coincidence or not, the United States Senate experienced its two 
most significant reforms within four years. In May 1913, ratification of the Seventeenth 
Amendment made the Senate a body directly elected by voters rather than by state legis-
latures. In March 1917, the Senate created a rule to end debate by a supermajority vote, a 
parliamentary mechanism intended to limit filibusters. The former is the one great consti-
tutional change in the structure of the Senate; the latter is the most important alteration of 
Senate procedure. 
At the time, both were seen as democratic reforms. In the long run their conse-
quences would be somewhat ironic and contradictory. The Seventeenth Amendment, the 
culmination of a decades-long popular and multifaceted progressive reform movement, 
brought subtle change. It soon seemed as unremarkable as it was inevitable; an inelucta-
ble correction soon taken for granted. The Seventeenth Amendment eliminated one of 
the main features James Madison and other Founders thought would improve the quality 
of deliberation in the Senate. Other such features included its smaller size and six-year 
term. Four years later, and produced, by comparison, virtually overnight and without op-
position, supermajority cloture would prove to be far more consequential as the twentieth 
century unfolded. By creating a rule that allows a minority to prevent action, the Senate 
did something Madison and company would have never approved. In fact, supermajority 
cloture was the opposite of what they wanted from the Senate. Madison and other 
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Founders sought a different quality, not quantity, of debate, a different kind of delibera-
tion, not a minority veto. 
The two transformations have generated separate lines of academic inquiry, espe-
cially since the early 1980s with the growth of the field of American Political Develop-
ment and an institutional turn in legal scholarship. More than the historical study of 
American politics, the American Political Development approach, which is heavily fo-
cused on institutions, has sought to develop and apply theories of political change. 
Scholars of the Seventeenth Amendment seek to explain how the great constitutional 
change occurred, and especially what its consequences were. Scholars of Senate proce-
dure probe the dynamics of minority obstruction, the filibuster, and the evolution and 
politics of supermajority cloture. 
Electing the Senate: Indirect Democracy Before the Seventeenth Amendment by 
Wendy Schiller and Charles Stewart1 and The Senate Syndrome: The Evolution of Pro-
cedural Warfare in the Modern U.S. Senate by Steven S. Smith,2 are the latest volumes 
on each of these watersheds in the history of that institution and the Senate’s awkward 
relationship with democracy. As far as ramifications for the substance of American poli-
tics, one story pretty much ends in 1913, while the other begins in 1917. If the former 
has to labor to make a claim of relevance, the latter could hardly be more timely—
especially given the historic November 2013 decision by the Senate to limit debate on 
confirmations of most presidential nominations. 
I. ELECTING THE SENATE 
On May 31, 1913, Secretary of State Williams Jennings Bryan certified that the 
requisite number of states had ratified the Seventeenth Amendment to the Constitution. 
Changing Senate elections from selection by state legislatures to direct popular election, 
the Seventeenth is the only amendment to fundamentally alter a compositional or repre-
sentational feature of an institution defined under Articles I, II, and III of the Constitu-
tion.3 Democratization of presidential and House elections were evolutionary develop-
ments driven by political competition and structured by state laws. Only the Senate 
required the use of Article V’s extraordinary process. The Amendment was the result of 
a decades-long campaign to fix what more and more of the country perceived as an un-
democratic and corrupt Senate.  
Given the importance of the Seventeenth Amendment, and because social scien-
tists live for this kind of natural before-and-after experiment, historians and political sci-
entists have scrutinized the effects of direct election of the Senate. The impact of the 
Amendment was complicated. At the time of its ratification, the Senate had been evolv-
ing toward popular selection in an increasing number of states wherein primary elections 
                                                            
 1. WENDY J. SCHILLER & CHARLES STEWART III, ELECTING THE SENATE: INDIRECT DEMOCRACY BEFORE 
THE SEVENTEENTH AMENDMENT (2015). 
 2. STEVEN S. SMITH, THE SENATE SYNDROME: THE EVOLUTION OF PROCEDURAL WARFARE IN THE 
MODERN U.S. SENATE (2014). 
 3. The Twelfth Amendment separated the election of President from Vice President, but that should be 
seen as a correction of an oversight. 
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informed state legislators of the people’s preference among the Senate candidates.4 Most 
studies show modest behavioral changes on the part of post-amendment Senators.5 The 
significance of direct election was arguably more in its symbolism than its substance. 
The nation could not abide an appointed Senate—especially one whose faults were on 
display—when both the House and President were, either by design or evolution, subject 
to democratic choice. 
As the full title of Electing the Senate suggests, Schiller and Stewart are interested 
primarily in elucidating the process of indirect election prior to the Seventeenth Amend-
ment. To that end, the authors created a comprehensive data set of state legislative ballot-
ing based on Senate selections from 1871-1913. The goal was to fill the gap in our 
knowledge with “a systematic account of how the upper chamber of Congress was actu-
ally elected in the forty-plus years before the passage of the Seventeenth Amendment.”6 
Additionally, they sought “to assess the consequences of the switch to direct elections 
with the adoption of the Seventeenth Amendment” and evaluate whether the change ful-
filled its promise.7 
While a careful reading will reward generalists and congressional scholars alike, 
Electing the Senate could have been a more consistent study. Whether this was partly a 
result of being a co-authored effort or not, Electing the Senate can read as though the au-
thors had not fully resolved either their substantive focus or target audience. Electing the 
Senate fluctuates, sometimes inelegantly, between language and description that seem 
directed to a general audience and sophisticated data analysis for specialists, to make at 
times arcane points that would be lost on many, if not most, non-specialists. Moreover, 
the effort they make to relate the history and consequences of the Amendment to con-
temporary politics is a source of some distraction and confusion. In the end, there is a 
tension or gap between the formidable and impressive empirical labors and the novelty, 
impact, or relevance of the findings. 
Aside from some limited potential insights about indirect election and the effect of 
changes in electoral mechanisms, the Seventeenth Amendment would seem devoid of 
relevance for contemporary American politics, plagued as it is by layers of dysfunction. 
Who, after all, would suggest a return to legislative selection of U.S. Senators? The Tea 
                                                            
 4. In this type of primary, the electorate voted for candidates for Senate. State legislators were then 
pledged or pressured to vote for the winning candidate. This was often referred to as the Oregon Plan because 
of that state’s innovative role in implementing and refining this form of electoral influence. 
 5. Charles III Stewart, Responsiveness in the Upper Chamber: The Constitution and the Institutional De-
velopment of the Senate, in THE CONSTITUTION AND AMERICAN POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT 63-96 (Peter F. 
Nardulli ed., 1992); Sara Brandes Crook & John R. Hibbing, A Not-so-distant Mirror: the 17th Amendment and 
Congressional Change, 91 AM. POLIT. SCI. REV. 845-53 (1997); William Bernhard & Brian R. Sala, The Re-
making of an American Senate: The 17th Amendment and Ideological Responsiveness, 68 J. POLIT. 345-57 
(2006); Wendy J. Schiller, Building Careers and Courting Constituents: U.S. Senate Representation 1889–
1924, 20 STUD. AM. POLIT. DEV. 185-197 (2006); Scott R. Meinke, Institutional Change and the Electoral 
Connection in the Senate: Revisiting the Effects of Direct Election, 61 POLIT. RES. Q. 445-57 (2008); Sean 
Gailmard & Jeffery A. Jenkins, Agency Problems, the 17th Amendment, and Representation in the Senate, 53 
AM. J. POLIT. SCI. 324-42 (2009); Steven Rogers, The Responsiveness of Direct and Indirect Elections, 37 
LEGIS. STUD. Q. 509-32 (2012). 
 6. SCHILLER & STEWART, supra note 1, at 2. 
 7. Id. at 1. 
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Party, that’s who. To be precise, this idea predates the Tea Party in politics8 and has been 
the subject of serious scholarship.9 Aside from a few scholars who argue, in the spirit of 
Madison, that selection rather than election would produce better senators, a revitaliza-
tion of federalism is the main political goal sought by the repeal of the Seventeenth 
Amendment.10 It is claimed a return to selection by state legislatures would stiffen state 
resistance to congressional encroachments. Especially given recent Republican efforts to 
gerrymander state districts, one might suspect the Tea Party’s overriding goal is more 
Republican Senators rather than stronger federalism. 
This muted call for repeal is what gives the book its claim to relevance, but using it 
as such engenders some problems. One of the central claims—made several times—is 
that parties were the crucial factor in the selection of Senators, but we knew that already. 
The strength of partisanship and power of party organization is a much-documented as-
pect of late nineteenth century American politics, and its dominant role in selection of 
senators was one motive for direct election. The authors’ repeated assertions about the 
paramount importance of party are aimed primarily at the Tea Party critique of direct 
election and its tenuous implication that there was a golden age when senators were 
elected by “states” to serve “state interests.” Senators were instead a product of partisan 
warfare to serve party interests. This is an example of the authors not carefully distin-
guishing recent political assertions from existing scholarship. More than once a reader 
might mistakenly infer that the authors’ targeted “conventional wisdom” is what most 
scholars think, rather than a mostly partisan argument emerging from a minority political 
movement. This, in turn, deflects attention from their empirical findings about the com-
plexity of the process and outcomes of indirect election. 
As far as the partisan struggles to select senators, the authors offer their most im-
portant findings in chapters 3 through 5. One interesting argument is that the state party 
“canvass” (when likely Senate candidates, such as Abraham Lincoln and Stephen Doug-
las, stumped the state in support of their party’s ticket for state elections) and even the 
subsequent state “primaries” (that essentially instructed state legislators to vote for a par-
ticular person) were not quite as determinative as sometimes asserted. Primaries in par-
ticular were often effective in producing a candidate to be ratified later by a legislative 
vote, but intra-party competition within the state legislature sometimes produced a selec-
tion different from what the primary put forward.11 Another valuable discussion concerns 
the variety of party mechanisms—forms of party caucuses—that were employed to struc-
ture the selection of senators. Even so, these chapters would have benefitted from a more 
                                                            
 8. For example, Democratic Senator Zell Miller introduced a repeal amendment in April 2004 (108 CONG. 
REC. S4503 (daily ed. Apr. 28, 2004) (statement of Sen. Miller)) and repeal of the 17th Amendment was a part 
of Republican Alan Keyes’ bid for the presidency the same year. See Rick Pearson, Keyes Says Game Plan Is 
Controversy, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2004-09-14/news/0409140179_1_keyes-
campaign-officials-keyes-comments-alan-keyes (last visited May 19, 2015). 
 9. C. H HOEBEKE, THE ROAD TO MASS DEMOCRACY: ORIGINAL INTENT AND THE SEVENTEENTH 
AMENDMENT (1995). 
 10. RALPH A. ROSSUM, FEDERALISM, THE SUPREME COURT, AND THE SEVENTEENTH AMENDMENT: THE 
IRONY OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY (2001); Todd Zywicki, Repeal the Seventeenth Amendment 62 
NAT’L REV. 20 (2010). 
 11. SCHILLER & STEWART, supra note 1, at 116. 
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precise and smooth integration of quantitative data and case studies. 
When Schiller and Stewart shift to the Amendment’s consequences, there is a no-
table tension between what they measure and the larger argument about whether the 
Amendment fulfilled its promise. Chapter 6, “Senate Electoral Responsiveness under In-
direct and Direct Elections,” begins with an extended and highly technical discussion of 
methodological questions regarding the measurement of bias in electoral systems. This is 
a preface to their quantitative analysis of relative partisan control of the Senate before 
and after the Amendment. “The Seventeenth Amendment,” they conclude, “did not af-
fect which party controlled the Senate for long periods, but it did influence the size of 
majorities with which Democrats and Republicans tried to govern after 1913.”12 Along 
with related details, the authors add considerably to our understanding of the political 
effects of direct election. But partisan control was not the stated, or even sub rosa, moti-
vation behind the movement. As the authors themselves note, they want to discern 
whether the Seventeenth Amendment met its goals of “empowering voters in the choice 
of U.S. senators, and reducing the corrosive effects of money and party machine pow-
er.”13 In fact, Schiller and Stewart go so far as to claim that “[p]romises made by advo-
cates of direct election about their capacity to produce a more participatory Senate . . . 
remain unfulfilled.”14 Those objectives and promises are, however, unrelated to which 
political party benefitted. While interesting, the data and analysis are not always relevant 
to an assessment of the degree to which the Amendment’s effects matched its intentions. 
The last chapter, “Myth and Reality of the Seventeenth Amendment,” reinforces 
rather than reconciles the problems of trying to use certain consequences of the amend-
ment as a commentary on contemporary politics. “Does today’s Senate,” the authors ask, 
“run more smoothly, efficiently, and honestly than its predecessor chambers elected un-
der indirect elections?”15 That is, “was the Seventeenth Amendment’s adoption a good 
thing?”16 They attempt to answer their own questions in part with a passage from a con-
temporaneous account of Senate dysfunction in 1897. “Sound familiar?” they ask.17 The 
implication is that direct election did not do much to improve the institution. But no one 
ever claimed direct election was a magic bullet that would cure the maladies that afflict 
collective action institutions such as the Senate, and that it would do so for an entire cen-
tury. 
The authors end by drawing lessons for the effort, hardly a movement, to imple-
ment direct election of the president. The first lesson is that direct election of the presi-
dent would be unlikely to change the type of candidates or the importance of money in 
presidential elections. However, those are not the core concerns of the current move-
ment.18 Direct election of the president is motivated by one overriding concern: one per-
                                                            
 12. Id. at 196. 
 13. Id. at 1. 
 14. Id. at 4. 
 15. Id. at 199. 
 16. SCHILLER & STEWART, supra note 1, at 199.  
 17. Id. at 200. 
 18. See, e.g., JOHN R. KOZA ET AL., EVERY VOTE EQUAL: A STATE-BASED PLAN FOR ELECTING THE 
PRESIDENT BY NATIONAL POPULAR VOTE (4th ed. 2013).  
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son, one vote. Whichever candidate gets the most votes nationwide should win. On and 
after November 7, 2000, millions of voters were not baffled and incensed about the Elec-
toral College because they wanted someone other than Bush or Gore, or loathed the sys-
tem of campaign finance. Americans could not comprehend how the election could come 
down to a flawed recount in one state—and an unprecedented Supreme Court interven-
tion19—when one candidate had won by nearly 550,000 votes nationwide. 
The second putative lesson asserted by the authors is that “trying to get around 
constitutional changes via changes to state laws can be fraught with peril.”20 That might 
be true in some general sense, but the state laws that preceded the adoption of the Seven-
teenth Amendment are hardly an example. The so-called Oregon primary laws were an 
instrumental part of the movement to get an amendment and those changes to state laws 
elected Senators more willing to vote for the Amendment. Because of this historical and 
strategic relationship between state efforts and the Amendment, the authors’ claim that 
“[e]ventually, supporters of a popular vote for senators . . . just had to amend the Consti-
tution to make direct election a reality,” falls flat.21 A national amendment was the inten-
tion all along and the state-level primary laws were an important part of the campaign. In 
short, there is much to be gleaned from the authors’ data and analysis, but Electing the 
Senate would have been a more cohesive and informative study had the authors focused 
on the task that motivated the project—providing the missing story of indirect Senate 
elections—and avoided commentary on the merits of the Seventeenth Amendment and 
constitutional reform more generally. 
II. OBSTRUCTING THE SENATE 
At the time of its passage, some saw the Seventeenth Amendment as only one of 
two vital steps to bring the Senate into the twentieth century. The other was filibuster re-
form; that is, some restriction on the practice of unlimited debate. Without this, “the 
promise of the Seventeenth Amendment may fall far short of realization.”22 Those words 
were written two years before the Senate enacted such a limitation. In 1917, the Senate 
added a rule that, for the first time since 1806, provided a motion and mechanism, known 
as cloture, for bringing debate to a close on a measure or nomination on the Senate floor. 
In lieu of an ordinary motion, such as the previous question, which is voted on immedi-
ately and if passed brings debate to an immediate close, Senate cloture requires a super-
majority (three-fifths of the entire Senate) and creates a lengthy period for debate even 
when the motion is successful. Unlike the Seventeenth Amendment, which had to scale 
the heights of Article V’s amendment process, this change in the Senate rules required 
only a majority vote in that body. Instead of fulfilling its intended purpose, cloture grad-
ually empowered obstruction, turned the Senate into a supermajority institution, and be-
came the functional equivalent of a constitutional alteration of the separation of powers. 
In fact, the contemporary Senate is frequently referred to as the sixty-vote Senate to 
                                                            
 19. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000). 
 20. SCHILLER & STEWART, supra note 1, at 216. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Charles S. Thomas, The Shackled Senate, 202 N. AM. REV. 424-31 (1915). 
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highlight the extent to which this supermajority procedure structures nearly all legislative 
action in that body. 
As a result, Steven Smith’s, The Senate Syndrome: The Evolution of Procedural 
Warfare in the Modern U.S. Senate, could not be more timely as far as the lamentable 
state of American government is concerned. Smith, one of the nation’s leading scholars 
of Congress and particularly the Senate, is not new to his subject. Given that “procedural 
warfare” has been the defining feature of the contemporary Senate and one of the main 
sources of systemic dysfunction, Smith does not have to labor for relevance. In fact, the 
book begins with the historic alteration of Senate procedure on November 21, 2013. On 
that date, the 113th Senate, employing the so-called “nuclear” or “constitutional” option, 
used a simple majority vote on a ruling from the chair to amend Senate practice and, in 
place of a three-fifths supermajority, allow debate to be closed on most presidential nom-
inations by a majority vote. According to Smith, who calls this “reform by ruling,” the 
“new precedent of 2013 was one of the most important procedural developments in Sen-
ate history[,]”23 certainly the most significant change to cloture since 1975, and arguably 
since it was written into Senate rules. This makes Smith’s volume the first in a long line 
of recent books on Senate process—and the filibuster in particular—to confront and 
comment on an actual, rather than speculative, limitation of minority power.24 
Those who study legislative affairs are familiar with Smith’s concept of the “Sen-
ate syndrome” from an article-length piece of the same name.25 Smith informs us that 
“[e]xplaining its emergence and consequences is my challenge in this book.”26 The Sen-
ate syndrome is “a pattern of behavior” created by the “combination of minority-
motivated obstruction and majority-imposed restrictions.”27 It is a syndrome because it 
involves 
 
the emergence of several behaviors that combine to make the Senate’s deci-
sion-making process much different from what it has been during most of its 
history. These behaviors include the greater frequency of minority obstruc-
tion, more concerted efforts by the majority to limit amending activity and 
circumvent the floor, the invention of new parliamentary strategies, quicker 
resort to last-resort tactics, and an enhanced role for party leaders in coordi-
nating and implementing these strategies. An “obstruct and restrict” pattern 
has dominated the Senate in recent Congresses—obstructive strategies by the 
minority are met by majority strategies to limit debate and amendment. “Reg-
                                                            
 23. SMITH, supra note 2, at 8. 
 24. RICHARD A. ARENBERG, DEFENDING THE FILIBUSTER: THE SOUL OF THE SENATE (2012); LAUREN C. 
BELL, FILIBUSTERING IN THE U.S. SENATE (Scott A. Frisch & Sean Q. Kelly eds., 2011);  GREGORY KOGER, 
FILIBUSTERING A POLITICAL HISTORY OF OBSTRUCTION IN THE HOUSE AND SENATE (2010); LAUREN C. BELL, 
FILIBUSTERING IN THE U.S. SENATE (2011); RICHARD A. ARENBERG, DEFENDING THE FILIBUSTER: THE SOUL 
OF THE SENATE (2012); GREGORY J WAWRO & ERIC SCHICKLER, FILIBUSTER: OBSTRUCTION AND 
LAWMAKING IN THE U.S. SENATE (2006); JAMES I. WALLNER, THE DEATH OF DELIBERATION: PARTISANSHIP 
AND POLARIZATION IN THE UNITED STATES SENATE (2013). 
 25. Steven S. Smith, The Senate Syndrome, in THE U.S. SENATE: FROM DELIBERATION TO DYSFUNCTION 
132-58 (Burdette A. Loomis ed., 2011). 
 26. SMITH, supra note 2, at 3. 
 27. Id. at 3. 
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ular order” evaporates and the Senate, known historically for its informality, is 
tied up in parliamentary procedure.28 
 
The syndrome is characterized by a spiraling effect wherein exploitation of the 
rules by the minority engenders majority efforts to undermine or get around such ob-
struction. The minority then claims it is forced to obstruct because the majority acts so 
precipitously to restrict its participation. And like some physical syndromes, what is 
causing what gets hard to pin down. But there is no denying the various behaviors are 
logically related. 
The attempts to escape or overcome the syndrome have produced further Madi-
sonian ironies. As Frances Lee has documented in her award-winning work, much of the 
Senate’s action is geared toward partisan electoral strategy rather than law-making. Po-
larization, divided government, and a sixty-vote Senate facilitate a rational calculation by 
many senators that substantive legislation is unlikely to pass, so if nothing else try to 
make the other side look bad.29 In turn, part of the syndrome—fueled by hyperpartisan-
ship—involves a new form of top-level centralization as the only way to break deadlocks 
to get at least something, anything, done.30 Instead of the kind of free and open debate 
that supposedly characterizes the Senate, the majority and minority leaders often negoti-
ate agreements behind closed doors, agreements that their senate troops often feel com-
pelled to ratify. This is a strange form of bipartisanship and not exactly the kind of delib-
eration Madison had in mind. 
The Senate Syndrome is organized in two parts. The first provides a 200-page his-
tory of the development of modern Senate procedure, divided into six periods from the 
1950s through the 2013 nuclear option. The second part covers select aspects of the po-
litical implications of the syndrome. This is the most thorough and effective account of 
the rise of the sixty-vote Senate and the syndrome that attends it. The explanation of the 
evolution of the syndrome features an exemplary combination of specificity and ap-
proachability. While the detail might exhaust even the most interested reader (the author 
might have skipped an account or two within each chapter), Smith’s ability to bring clari-
ty to even the most arcane aspects of Senate process never lapses. 
Smith shows that the sixty-vote Senate and the Senate syndrome were built from 
myriad small steps and actions involving a host of formal and informal procedures, all 
pushed and prodded by divided government and increasing partisan polarization. As 
norms that inhibited or limited obstruction eroded, various devices—some new and some 
enhanced—were turned into weapons of parliamentary warfare, including unanimous 
consent agreements, holds, informal methods of reaching bicameral agreement, the 
budgetary and reconciliation process, amendment trees, and proactive use of cloture. 
Senate practices evolved in such a way that minority factions, and even individual sena-
tors, came to see obstruction as a powerful and increasingly accepted tool, which in turn 
                                                            
 28. Id. at 9. 
 29. FRANCES E. LEE, BEYOND IDEOLOGY: POLITICS, PRINCIPLES, AND PARTISANSHIP IN THE U.S. SENATE 
(2009). 
 30. WALLNER, supra note 24. 
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motivated majority leaders to find new and unconventional ways of coping. One relative-
ly recent example is the incorporation of a sixty-vote threshold, most commonly for 
amendments, into unanimous consent agreements to structure action on a bill.31 That is, 
to obtain agreement to consider a bill, the unanimous consent request provides that one 
or more amendments must get at least sixty votes to be incorporated into the legislation, 
thereby building supermajority votes directly into final decisions.32 
The second section of Senate Syndrome covers select aspects of what Smith terms 
the implications of the syndrome. This part is likewise excellent, even if at points some 
repetition could have been avoided. Smith keeps the focus on empirical analysis: how 
supermajority cloture affects Senate lawmaking; further detail on the implications of the 
2013 “reform by ruling”; other possible changes and the motives senators and parties 
have in resisting or promoting procedural reform. Smith also uses a chapter to show how 
media coverage unwittingly contributes to the syndrome. All too frequently Senate ac-
tion is not precisely depicted by journalists, such as reporting that the Senate defeated a 
measure when in fact a majority supported it, or implying that sixty votes were required 
to pass a particular measure. The first way of portraying things obscures the fact that a 
minority prevented a majority decision; the second gives the impression that a constitu-
tional supermajority threshold of support was required but not reached. 
In the end, Smith is refreshingly skeptical about claims—often voiced by sena-
tors—that the problem is not the rules but hyper-partisanship and the behavior of sena-
tors, and he clearly sees the syndrome as a problem to be remedied. But, after such a 
comprehensive analysis of the evolution and manifestations of the syndrome, his final 
thought—”[t]he Senate syndrome . . . makes it even more challenging to hold Senate par-
ties accountable for their behavior”33—lacks punch. Smith renders no verdict on the val-
ue of supermajority cloture, and he resists any normative conclusions about reform. I 
think this unfortunate because it would be an even better book with such judgments, and 
if scholars such as Smith do not draw appropriate conclusions, the public debate is that 
much more impoverished.34 
III. FIXING THE SENATE 
Thus, the relationship of these two volumes to institutional change is somewhat 
ironic. While Electing the Senate offers would-be reformers some unwarranted advice or 
caution rather loosely connected to any live issue, the Senate Syndrome is silent as to 
recommendations even though supermajority rule in the Senate is one of the central di-
lemmas and controversies in current American government. I think political science, and 
congressional studies in particular, should take on questions of reform with greater regu-
                                                            
 31. SMITH, supra note 2, at 221-27. 
 32. Senate action on gun control in the wake of the Sandy Hook school massacre is one of the most noted 
and notorious examples of this abuse of supermajority procedure. Jonathan Weisman, Senate Blocks Drive for 
Gun Control, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 17, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/18/us/politics/senate-obama-gun-
control.html. 
 33. SMITH, supra note 2, at 361. 
 34. It is worth noting that as part of an earlier co-authored book on the filibuster, Smith advocated signifi-
cant limitations on supermajority cloture; SARAH A BINDER & STEVEN S. SMITH, POLITICS OR PRINCIPLE?: 
FILIBUSTERING IN THE UNITED STATES SENATE (1997). 
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larity and authority. By comparison, legal scholarship has often done a better job of tak-
ing positions on institutional reform.35 Smith’s is the best general account of the plight of 
the contemporary Senate, but on some questions we need better normative arguments 
rather than additional empirical analysis. While it has not been a huge topic in democrat-
ic thought, political theorist Melissa Schwartzberg, for example, subjects supermajority 
procedures to a thorough and precise critique.36 
We can debate the abstract merits of repealing the Seventeenth Amendment, but 
that train is not leaving the station. And whereas it is not clear what would be gained 
from a return to legislative selection for senators, the case for ending or restricting su-
permajority cloture is compelling, if still debatable. In contrast to the Seventeenth 
Amendment, supermajority cloture eventually contradicted its original purpose to be-
come the functional equivalent of a constitutional amendment. Instead of taming the 
abuse of extended debate it created the sixty-vote Senate and the Senate syndrome. In-
stead of enhancing deliberation, it has subverted it. Limitations on supermajority cloture 
might have seemed as quixotic as repeal of the Seventeenth Amendment, but in late 2013 
the Senate voted for an historic reassertion of majority rule on nominations. In my view, 
further movement in that direction should be encouraged and pursued. 
Meanwhile, there is another foundation of the Senate that, while implicit in any 
discussion of the institution, goes all but unmentioned in these studies. Two senators per 
state or equal representation, “always a subject more or less disturbing to logical 
minds,”37 runs afoul of the central principle of modern democracy—one person, one 
vote—and makes the Senate by some measures the most unrepresentative legislative 
body in the world. An end to equal representation is certainly more fanciful than a return 
to direct election of Senators or the implementation of direct presidential election, but it 
is worth having that debate because there is no larger violation of the fundamental prin-
ciple of democracy with almost no contemporary justification to offset that objection. 
Empiricists might argue that we would end up electing the same kind of people, but that 
is hardly the point. The modern Senate, as a result, is defined by the distortions of equal 
representation and supermajority cloture. And the combination of these two attributes in 
the same legislative body is rarely noted, studied, or criticized. Again, we do not need 
more empirical analysis of their effects as much as we need to decide whether the distor-
tions, especially united in the same institution, are acceptable democratic practice. 
These two books evoke the Senate’s troubled relationship to American democracy. 
If direct election remedied one tension, supermajority cloture has produced another, even 
as equal representation performs its ongoing and increasingly obscure function. Despite 
its self-conception as the greatest deliberative body in the world, the Senate too often ap-
pears as all but the opposite of nearly everything it claims to be, more a problem than a 
palladium as far as democracy and good governance are concerned. Robert Lindblom 
                                                            
 35. For example, Michael J. Gerhardt, The Constitutionality of the Filibuster, 21 CONST. COMMENT. 445 
(2004); Josh Chafetz, The Unconstitutionality of the Filibuster, 43 CONN. L. REV. 1003 (2011). 
 36. MELISSA SCHWARTZBERG, COUNTING THE MANY: THE ORIGINS AND LIMITS OF SUPERMAJORITY RULE 
(2014). See also Frances E. Lee, A discussion of Melissa Schwartzberg’s Counting the Many: The Origins and 
Limits of Supermajority Rule, 13 PERSPECT. POLIT. 455-65 (2015). 
 37. S. E. Moffett, Is the Senate Unfairly Constituted?, 10 POLIT. SCI. Q. 248-56, 248 (1895). 
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closes his magnum opus Politics and Markets with a final comment on the power of the 
modern business corporation “as a peculiar organization in an ostensible democracy.”38  
The large private corporation, he writes, “fits oddly into democratic theory and vision. 
Indeed, it does not fit.”39 The same can be said of the contemporary United States Sen-
ate. Even if inadvertently, Electing the Senate reminds us that the Senate can be funda-
mentally changed to improve the fit, and The Senate Syndrome gives us the place to 
begin that project. 
                                                            
 38. CHARLES E. LINDBLOM, POLITICS AND MARKETS: THE WORLD’S POLITICAL ECONOMIC SYSTEMS 356 
(1977). 
 39. Id. 
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